Coming on the heels of the Third Ratna Ling Conference on First-Person Methodologies, this article makes interesting reading. I can imagine people reacting very differently, depending on their own interests.
The aim of the article is conservative. As they say toward the end [118],
Our ambition has not been to suggest a complete and flawless first-person methodology . . . nor is it an attempt to reinvent or create a ‘new and fundamentally different’ science of consciousness.†Rather, we have sought out an approach that is relatively specific in making suggestions to scientists on how to go about integrating first-person methods in cognitive science. These are suggestions that have already been used in experiments, and therefore should be easy to integrate in the disciplines of cognitive science and neuroscience as they are currently carried out.”
More evidence of their conservative slant comes from this comment on neurophenomenology [106]: “Neurophenomenology would demand a paradigm change in cognitive science in order to have any noticeable impact, and this might be unlikely.â€
The article performs a useful function in clarifying the difference between introspection and phenomenological methods. although they note that the key first-person research that has been done so far (mainly the work by Lutz et. al. mentioned below) could be considered to fall in both categories, and could also be considered to exemplify neurophenomenology. So perhaps the distinction is not that helpful after all. They cite Zahavi to the effect that phenomenology is not about private thoughts, but rather about intersubjectively accessible modes of experience [110]; if this is universally agreed upon, I would regard it as a significant limitation on phenomenology.
They also make a useful distinction among three stages at which first-person methods could ‘enrich’ cognitive science: in the pre-experimental design process (by ‘front-loading’ the design of the experiment); in the experimental situation itself (that is, in how data is gathered, and what kind of data), and in post-experiment interviews that can inspire new ways of looking at the data.
When it comes to citing examples, the main one they use is Lutz, et. al.: an experiment on reaction times in which the subjects were trained to be phenomenologically aware of whether they were focused or distracted at the time of a stimulus. It seems to me a pretty modest experiment, but perhaps I’m just an impatient fellow.
I find it interesting that they do not cite Claire’s work; I can’t recall at the moment whether they cite Russ’ work, but if so, they make little of it. Their focus seems to be more on third-person science that is informed by first-person approaches (or even more specifically, “rigorous first-person reports” [104]) than on what might be called ‘pure’ first-person work. And this is to be expected, given their orientation. But I would be especially interested in what others have to say about this.
Jack